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WELCOME 
DEAN TREANOR: I’m Bill Treanor.  I’m the Dean of Fordham 
Law School.  It’s my pleasure to welcome you to tonight’s event, which 
is the Seventh Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, 
Securities and Financial Law. 
Fordham is a school that has always taken incredible pride in its 
business law offerings.  We’re a school that is ranked in the top twenty 
nationally in terms of our business law program.5
We have really an extraordinary faculty.  This year we welcome 
two new corporate law hires: Sean Griffith6 and Richard Squire.7  We 
have a remarkable adjunct faculty that brings leading practitioners in to 
offer courses on really the cutting edge of practice. 
We have a journal, the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial 
Law,8 which I am now holding up to you.  It has been cited by the 
Supreme Court.9  It is available outside. 
And we also have—and are now, I think, in the fifth year of—our 
Corporate Center, which really brings it all together.10  I’d like to thank 
the leadership of the Corporate Law Center.  John Peloso,11 who is with 
us here today, has really led the way and was really a visionary in this 
area, so I wanted to thank John. 
We have a remarkable faculty who has always supported it.  I see 
Gus Katsoris12 here, who is a legend in the business law field.  We have 
two brilliant faculty directors: Jill Fisch, who is one of the leaders in 
 5. See Leiter’s Law School Rankings, as measured by “Faculty Quality in 
Specialty Areas,” available at http://www.leiterrankings.com/faculty/2003faculty_ 
businesslaw.shtml. 
 6. Sean J. Griffith is an Associate Professor of Law at Fordham University School 
of Law. 
 7. Richard C. Squire is an Associate Professor of Law at Fordham University 
School of Law. 
 8. For more information, please visit the Fordham Journal of Corporate & 
Financial Law website, http://law.fordham.edu/publications/index.ihtml?pubid=600 
(last visited February, 22 2007). 
 9. See Arthur Anderson LLP v. U.S., 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005). 
 10. For more information, please visit the Fordham Center for Corporate, Securities 
& Financial Law website, http://www.fordham.edu/law/faculty/fisch/source.html (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2007). 
 11. John F.X. Peloso is senior counsel at Morgan, Lewis & Bockius and an Adjunct 
Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law. 
 12. Constantine N. Katsoris is the Wilkinson Professor of Law at Fordham 
University School of Law. 
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corporate law in the country, has just been so superb; and Caroline 
Gentile,13 who has really done an amazing job in her relatively brief 
period at Fordham, comes to us from Cravath.  Ann Rakoff14 has 
provided great leadership this year. 
And again, the Corporate Center is really our jewel, and of its 
jewels the A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture is really something that we have 
taken such great pride in since its origins. 
We are joined here tonight by Starr Sommer.  Thank you very much 
for coming up from Washington to be here tonight. 
It should be a fabulous lecture.  Our lecturer tonight is really an 
extraordinary one, Margaret Cole, who is, as I assume you all know, one 
of London’s most experienced and respected financial services litigators.  
She became the Director of Enforcement of the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) in July of 2005.15  The FSA regulates all financial 
services in the United Kingdom (U.K.), including the banking, 
insurance, mortgage, and securities industries.  We’re just so delighted 
that she is here tonight delivering this great lecture, continuing really 
such a fabulous series. 
Now, to do the formal introduction, it’s my pleasure to introduce 
Ben Indek, a Partner at Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, who will present 
tonight’s opening remarks. 
OPENING REMARKS 
MR. INDEK: Good evening, everybody.  On behalf of Morgan, 
Lewis & Bockius, welcome to the Seventh Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. 
Lecture. 
This lecture was established by Morgan Lewis to honor our partner 
most identified with the securities industry.  Al Sommer was a Partner at 
Morgan Lewis from 1979 until 1994, when he became counsel to the 
firm and its clients.  He was a terrific lawyer and a prolific author and 
commentator on a wide range of securities law issues.  Al is best known 
for his service as an SEC Commissioner from 1973–1976, and as 
Chairman of the Public Oversight Board of the American Institute of 
 13. Caroline Gentile is an Associate Professor of Law at Fordham University 
School of Law. 
 14. Ann Rakoff is the Executive Director of the Fordham Center for Corporate, 
Securities and Financial Law. 
 15. For more information, please visit the Financial Services Authority website, 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk (last visited Jan. 23, 2007). 
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CPAs.16
I am particularly pleased that Margaret Cole, the U.K. FSA’s 
Director of Enforcement, will deliver tonight’s lecture for two reasons.  
First, over the last ten months in which I’ve gotten to know Margaret, I 
came to see that, because of her years spent in the defense bar, Margaret 
would take a practical approach to issues, but, at the same time, be a 
passionate regulator, with a no-nonsense attitude towards securities law 
violators.  As a private lawyer and government regulator, I think Al 
would have appreciated both qualities. 
Second, Margaret’s remarks on U.K. enforcement issues would 
have been of keen interest to Al.  In addition to being a preeminent 
expert in U.S. securities law, Al had an interest and expertise in 
international law issues.  For example, Al was an active member of the 
International Bar Association,17 where, among other things, he was 
Deputy Chairman of the Capital Markets Forum.18  He also acted as a 
consultant to several foreign countries on the development of their 
securities laws and regulations, including being an advisor to the U.K.’s 
Office of Fair Trading in 1983.19  It is clear that Al would have enjoyed 
hearing what our keynote speaker has to say about U.K. regulation. 
Al was with us for the first two lectures to introduce our speaker, 
but passed away in 2002 after a long illness.  He is represented here 
tonight, as Dean Treanor has indicated, by his wife, Starr, who came up 
from Washington, and his son-in-law Jeff.  We are honored that they 
could attend tonight’s lecture. 
When Al joined our firm twenty-seven years ago, he came to start a 
securities law practice.  Today, we have more than 100 lawyers in about 
a half-a-dozen cities in that practice.  Those cities now include London, 
where we have a new and vibrant securities practice, a fact that would 
have tickled Al.  All of these lawyers are dedicated to serving the 
securities industry on broker-dealer, investment advisor, investment 
company, enforcement defense, securities litigation and white-collar 
 16. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.  For more information, 
please visit the AICPA website, http://www.aicpa.org (last visited Jan. 23, 2007). 
 17. For more information, please visit the International Bar Association website, 
http://www.ibanet.org (last visited Jan. 23, 2007). 
 18. For more information, please visit the Capital Markets Forum website, 
http://www.ibanet.org/legalpractice/Capital_Markets_Forum.cfm (last visited Jan. 23, 
2007). 
 19. For more information, please visit the Office of Fair Trading website, 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/default.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2007). 
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issues.  We are also active in the public company accounting and 
corporate governance areas. 
We are proud of Al’s affiliation with Morgan Lewis and delighted 
to sponsor this annual lecture in his honor. 
I’m pleased to turn tonight’s proceedings over to Jill Fisch, the 
Director of Fordham’s Center for Corporate, Securities & Financial Law 
and our host this evening. 
PROF. FISCH: Good evening.  I’m Jill Fisch.  I’m the Director of 
The Fordham Center for Corporate, Securities & Financial Law.  I’m 
delighted to welcome you on behalf of the Fordham Law community to 
the Seventh Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture. 
I would like to express the School’s deep gratitude to the firm of 
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius for their generosity in establishing the 
lecture.  I’m delighted that Al Sommer’s family could join us tonight.  I 
also want to express our pleasure that the SEC Historical Society20 is 
joining us tonight.  I’d also like to thank Margaret Cole for agreeing to 
deliver the lecture. 
In the few short years since its inception—and you might think, 
well, okay, what was the reaction to corporate governance scandals?  
Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley.21  Fordham established the Corporate 
Center.  Everybody deals with things in their own way. 
In the few short years since its inception, the Fordham Corporate 
Center has developed a reputation for bringing the finest legal and 
business talent to the Law School.  Recent public lectures have included 
Congressman Oxley’s speech last month, “Securing the U.S. Economy: 
Protecting Investors in Our Capital Markets,” and New York Attorney 
General Eliot Spitzer’s lecture last spring.22  Last year’s Sommer 
Lecture was delivered by Citigroup General Counsel Edward Greene,23 
and I’m delighted that he is here tonight as well.  An additional public 
program last spring, called “Bigger Carrots and Bigger Sticks,” featured 
a panel discussion of issues and developments in corporate sentencing, a 
topic of particular importance in light of the recent and ongoing series—
it seems like a never-ending series—of corporate governance scandals.  
 20. For more information, please visit the SEC Historical Society website, 
http://www.sechistorical.org (last visited Jan. 31, 2007). 
 21. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 107 P.L. 204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 22. The Fifth Annual Albert A. DeStefano Lecture on Corporate, Securities & 
Financial Law, 11 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 1 (2005). 
 23. The Sixth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securities and 
Financial Law, 11 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 697 (2006). 
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After options back-dating and pretexting, you wonder what’s next on the 
horizon. 
The Corporate Center hosts a variety of other programs.  We have a 
Business Law Practitioners Series, which is geared to introducing our 
students to developments and career options in business law.  We have 
policy-oriented roundtables, and more.  We are partnering with ALI-
ABA24 to bring several of their programs in business law to Fordham 
later this fall.  And, of course, we at Fordham are very proud of both the 
Securities Arbitration Clinic and the Fordham Journal of Corporate & 
Financial Law.  I know that many students from both of those programs 
are in the audience tonight. 
As you know, we at Fordham are delighted to host the Sommer 
Lecture.  The Dean used the word “jewel,” so I won’t.  With the 
assistance of Morgan Lewis and the Corporate Center’s Board of 
Advisers, we have been fortunate in being able to attract the very cream 
of the country’s—and now the world’s—leadership in business law to 
speak here at the School.  We have been privileged to hear the insights 
of our speakers on significant legal developments and cutting-edge 
regulatory issues. 
If there has been a shortcoming in our programming, it has perhaps 
been the failure to pay sufficient attention to global issues.  Fordham 
Law School, as you know, has a substantial number of foreign students, 
an international LLM program, and a strong reputation in international 
law.  So I’m delighted that we’re addressing our ethnocentrism tonight 
and broadening our focus with tonight’s speaker. 
Traditionally, the United Kingdom and the United States have been 
leaders in the capital markets.  But there have been substantial 
differences in their approach to regulation and enforcement.  As you all 
know, in the United States the Securities and Exchange Commission has 
primary regulatory authority over the securities markets, and we have 
had a number of SEC officials deliver prior Sommer Lectures.25
 24. American Law Institute-American Bar Association.  For more information, 
please visit the ALI-ABA website, http://www.ali-aba.org (last visited Jan. 23, 2007). 
 25. See, e.g., The Sixth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securities 
and Financial Law, 11 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 697 (2006) (Edward F. Greene, 
former SEC general counsel); The Third Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on 
Corporate, Securities and Financial Law, 8 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 335 (2003) 
(Harvey Goldschmid, SEC Commissioner) and The Inaugural A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture 
on Corporate, Securities and Financial Law, 6 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 259 (2001) 
(Hon. Arthur Leavitt, Jr., former SEC Chairman). 
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The SEC’s counterpart in the United Kingdom is the FSA.  The 
U.K. Financial Services Authority is an independent, nongovernmental 
body, given statutory powers by the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000.26  It’s the single U.K. statutory regulator, with direct responsibility 
for regulating deposit-taking, insurance, and investments.27  It is also the 
listing authority for the admission of securities to the Official List.28  
The FSA assumed the powers and responsibilities of ten separate 
predecessor bodies. The statute sets out the FSA’s objectives as follows: 
“market confidence, public awareness, consumer protection, and the 
reduction of financial crime.”29
Margaret Cole was appointed to her present position, Director of 
Enforcement at the FSA, in 2005.  Ms. Cole, a solicitor with over twenty 
years of experience in private practice, was previously a Partner in the 
London office of White & Case, where she founded and headed the 
firm’s Dispute Resolution Department.  Her clients included the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Royal Bank of 
Canada, and Crédit Agricole.  In the 1990s, Ms. Cole led the actions to 
recover the Maxwell Company pension funds on behalf of the fund 
trustee and she succeeded in obtaining a global settlement restoring the 
missing funds. 
Ms. Cole is accredited by the Center for Effective Dispute 
Resolution30 and the Alternative Dispute Resolution Group.31  She was 
educated at Newhall Cambridge and graduated from the College of Law, 
Lancaster Gate, with honors. 
At the FSA, Ms. Cole leads a team of 270 and reports directly to the 
FSA Chief Executive.  Her work at the Enforcement Division includes 
conducting investigations, administrative, civil and criminal 
proceedings, obtaining redress for consumers, and working 
cooperatively with the FSA’s domestic and international counterparts on 
investigations and enforcement actions. 
 26. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 1 (U.K.). 
 27. See Introduction to the Financial Services Authority at 3, available at http:// 
www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/fsa_intro.pdf (last visited February 22, 2007) [hereinafter 
FSA Introduction]. 
 28. Id. at 15. 
 29. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 1 (U.K.). 
 30. For more information, please visit the Center for Effective Dispute Resolution 
website, http://www.cedr.co.uk (last visited Jan. 23, 2007). 
 31. For more information, please visit the Alternative Dispute Resolution Group 
website, http://www.adrgroup.co.uk (last visited Jan. 23, 2007). 
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Here to ask—and perhaps answer—the question of whether the 
FSA does it better is Margaret Cole. 
FEATURED LECTURER 
MS. COLE: Mrs. Sommer and ladies and gentlemen, I am really 
delighted and honored to be with you tonight and to have been asked to 
deliver this Seventh Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, 
Securities and Financial Law, with the title, as you know, “The U.K. 
FSA: Nobody Does It Better?”  I was asked to suggest a catchy title for 
my talk this evening.  As you can see, I have followed the philosophy of 
the Enforcement Division and been very bold and resolute in my choice 
of a theme. 
Standing in front of this distinguished audience here tonight, I am 
wondering whether another title, perhaps another song title, comes to 
mind, perhaps “Fools Rush In.” 
But I note with interest that I am your first overseas speaker.  As 
such, I hope you are going to give me a bit of license to depart from 
what is the usual British norm of understatement so that I can engage in 
a bit of shameless “PR” for the U.K. Financial Services Authority and 
how we go about our business. 
My title does at least end with an interrogation mark.  If this was a 
debate, as the title suggests, I would be standing up here for the FSA and 
there would be a long line of U.S. regulators ranged against me, 
including the SEC, Federal Reserve Bank,32 CFTC,33 NASD,34 
numerous regulators of insurance, numerous regulators of exchanges, 
and others.  They would all be on the other side of this very long table 
opposing my motion. 
Outnumbered I would be, yes.  But, very solid in my convictions, I 
would be arguing many of the points that I am going to raise today, such 
as the benefits of having a unitary authority; how London’s philosophy 
of “light-touch”35 regulation has helped it in becoming the world’s 
 32. For more information, please visit the Federal Reserve Board website, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov (last visited Nov. 5, 2006). 
 33. Commodity Futures Trading Commission.  For more information, please visit 
the CFTC website, http://www.cftc.gov (last visited Nov. 5, 2006). 
 34. National Association of Securities Dealers.  For more information, please visit 
the NASD website, http://www.nasd.com/index.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2006). 
 35. See John Tiner, FSA Chief Executive, U.K.’s Leading Role in the Adoption of 
International Initiatives, Keynote Address at the BBA 10th Annual Supervision 
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leading center for mobile capital; how the FSA is not an enforcement-
led regulator at all, but one that uses supervision and ongoing 
relationships with the firms as its front-line means of regulation; and 
how the FSA is recognized in the international community of regulators 
as a thought leader, always seeking new approaches to better regulation, 
demonstrated, for example, by our deliberate shift to more principles-
based regulation.  We continue to have our aspiration of being the most 
admired and respected regulator globally. 
I also want to mention some things that some of my opponents in 
this hypothetical debate would almost certainly raise.  They might well 
say, for example, that there is a conspicuous absence of criminal 
prosecutions of securities law violations in the United Kingdom; or that 
the FSA’s resources are very widely spread across its huge jurisdiction; 
or that the strategic approach to enforcement sends out selective 
messages and allows some illicit activity to go unpunished. 
Now, in this debate some such criticisms might be fairly argued.  
But I would still argue that our model in the United Kingdom is an 
innovative and highly effective one.  It may not be the perfect model of 
regulation, but I do genuinely believe that it is one that gets a lot of the 
very important things right.  I am also, however, the first to recognize 
that there are many things that we can learn from you. 
Now to some background about the FSA to give some context to 
my proposition. 
The FSA is a body, as Jill mentioned, that is operationally 
independent of the U.K. government.36  We were set up in 1997 by the 
then-incoming Labour administration.  That was the second thing that 
they did, after making the Bank of England37 independent in respect of 
monetary policy.  We are the result of a merger of ten predecessor 
regulators.  We are now a one-stop regulatory shop for virtually all 
aspects of financial services regulation in the United Kingdom. 
We are financed by fees levied on the firms, large and small, that 
fall within our remit. 
We have supervisory responsibility for wholesale and retail 
markets, equities and derivatives trading, banking and insurance.  The 
FSA also acts as the competent authority for listing in the United 
Conference (Oct. 11, 2006), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/ 
Communication/Speeches/2006/1011_jt.shtml (last visited Jan. 20, 2007). 
 36. See FSA Introduction, supra note 27, at 18. 
 37. For more information, please visit the Bank of England website, 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk (last visited Nov. 6, 2006). 
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Kingdom.  The scope of the activities we regulate was more recently 
expanded to include mortgage and general insurance.38
One fact you may find of topical interest: we do not authorize or 
regulate hedge funds, which is not to say that we’re not concerned about 
the risks they pose.  I’ll come back and say some more about that in a 
moment. 
We regulate an industry that employs one million people—the 
population of the United Kingdom is just about 60 million people—and 
accounts for 7% of GDP.39  We have 2,800 staff and a current budget of 
£266 million.40
As Jill mentioned, so I won’t take too long on it, the cornerstone of 
our powers is the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.41  We rather 
inelegantly shortened that to FSMA.  FSMA gave us a wide range of 
rulemaking, investigatory, and enforcement powers and certain 
important responsibilities, including the ability to take action to prevent 
market abuse and to prosecute offenders for insider dealing.42
FSMA also gave us those four statutory objectives that were 
mentioned previously: firstly, market confidence, maintaining 
confidence in the financial system; second, public awareness, promoting 
public understanding of the financial system; third, consumer protection, 
securing the appropriate degree of protection for consumers; and fourth, 
the reduction of financial crime, reducing the extent to which it is 
possible for a business to be used for a purpose connected with financial 
crime.43
Those objectives govern the way we carry out our general functions 
and help ensure that the FSA is accountable in political, public, and legal 
terms.  We have to report annually to Parliament on how successful we 
 38. See FSA Opens the Doors to Mortgage and General Insurance Firms (Nov. 3, 
2003) http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Communication/PR/2003/117.shtml (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2007). 
 39. Gross Domestic Product.  See Vernon Everitt, Director of Retail Themes, FSA, 
The FSA’s Regulatory Approach and Raising Financial Capability Through the 
Workplace, Speech at CBI, Executive Lunch, Birmingham (Sept. 14, 2006), available 
at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2006/0914_ve.shtml 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2006); see also National Statistics, available at 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/CCI/nugget.asp?ID=6 (last visited Nov. 5, 2006). 
 40. See Facts and Figures, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/Media/Facts/ 
index.shtml (last visited Feb. 22, 2007) [hereinafter Facts]. 
 41. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 1 (U.K.). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
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have been in meeting our objectives, and when we interpret those 
objectives wrongly or fail to consider them we can be challenged in the 
courts.44
So we are a single regulator with a single aim: to promote the 
statutory objectives, and we have, at last count, 30,000 firms and 
165,000 individuals to regulate.45
Let me say something about our approach to regulation to deliver 
our objectives. 
Our clear preference is to encourage efficient markets.  Our 
philosophy is that only after market solutions have been exhausted 
should regulatory initiatives be contemplated. 
A very good example of this was the work done alongside the U.S. 
Federal Reserve Bank, as well as the Swiss and German authorities, to 
address concerns about growing operational risk associated with 
confirmations for credit risk derivatives.46  This problem couldn’t be 
solved by any one regulator or any one firm and required collaboration 
between regulators in different countries, something which will, of 
course, become increasingly essential in the global landscape of 
financial services. 
Together, we met with the industry and set out the problem, and the 
industry came back with proposals which the regulators discussed.  
There was an agreement on approaches and tracking of improvements, 
and I am pleased to say the results have been good. 
There are numerous risks in the financial markets, so we adopt a 
disciplined approach to identify the big-ticket risks to our objectives.  
This risk-based approach is designed to align our finite resources with 
addressing the big risks that matter the most.  This means that we—and 
others—need to accept that some things can and will go wrong, what we 
refer to as a “non-zero-failure regime.”  Our view is that, although the 
idea that regulation should seek to eliminate all failures may be 
appealing in theory, in practice it imposes prohibitive costs on the 
industry and on consumers. 
 44. See Facts, supra note 40. 
 45. See John Tiner & John Fingleton, Office of Fair Trading and FSA, Delivering 
Better Regulatory Outcomes, A Joint FSA and OFT Action Plan (April 2006), available 
at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/OFT_FSA_Actionplan.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 
2006). 
 46. See John Tiner, Chief Executive, FSA, Chief Executive’s Report, Annual 
Report 2005/06, available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/ar05_06/ar05_06.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2006). 
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Now, the FSA’s decision to be a risk-based regulator is a conscious 
and deliberate decision, and we regularly review the amount of risk that 
we are prepared to accept and focus our resources on the risks that we 
consider matter the most.  We are keen to ensure that our regulatory 
interventions always add to, rather than detract from, the positive impact 
of market forces and really are justified in terms of the level of risk to 
our statutory objectives and the consequences of harm that would 
otherwise arise. 
Consequently, even where empirical analysis shows that there has 
been a market failure, we are not always convinced that regulatory 
intervention is the most efficient and cost-effective form of correction.  
Market failures can also be addressed using other mechanisms, such as 
competition policy, or the FSA using its considerable influence with 
market participants and their trade representatives to change firms’ 
policies, processes, and behaviors, without reaching for the heavy-
handed tool of the regulator’s rule book.  The FSA is very firmly of the 
view that regulators must be very wary of the damaging effects that they 
can have on creativity, innovation and competition. 
In support of this risk-based approach, the FSA is an advocate for 
principles-based regulation.  That’s why the focus is on the outcomes 
rather than on the prescription of detailed rules.  Targeting outcomes—
such as, for example, customers of financial firms treated fairly, or firms 
holding financial resources sufficient for the risks they run—enables 
companies to focus on the substance of what is good for their business, 
their customers, and for society around them. 
Now, the FSA’s eleven high-level principles for businesses have 
been around since 2001 and set overarching requirements for all 
financial services firms.47  They are the regulatory equivalent of first 
principles that articulate what actions and behaviors we expect of firms.  
We see real benefits for firms, markets, and consumers, as well as for 
our own people, in tipping the balance materially towards principles and 
away from prescription.  We believe that providing firms with the 
flexibility to decide more often for themselves what businesses 
processes and controls should operate will better align good regulation 
with good business practice. 
We also believe that firms that seriously commit to a set of 
outcome-based principles are in the best position to judge the detail of 
 47. See FSA’s Principles for Businesses, available at http://fsahandbook.info 
/FSA/html/handbook/PRIN/2/1 (last visited Nov. 6, 2006). 
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how best to deliver those outcomes in the marketplace.  By taking this 
approach, we create incentives for firms to focus on compliance in 
return for a regulatory dividend, and that’s less regulatory intervention. 
We also think that a “tick-box” mentality towards rule compliance, 
at the expense of judgment and real understanding of the business, de-
skills the industry, because good people who like to exercise judgment 
will leave that kind of environment, and we want to make sure that we 
have good people in all sectors of the U.K. financial services industry. 
However, an approach along these lines is not always easy—in fact, 
it is never easy.  Both regulators and the regulated find a sense of safety 
and security in detailed rules, as they define the scope of their legal 
exposure.  But while rules-based standards are authoritative and 
enforceable, they do not prevent dishonest practice. 
We think that the regulator and the regulated must be bold enough 
to accept some uncertainty and ambiguity and to manage any consequent 
legal risks for the benefit of society and the markets as a whole.  So, for 
our part, when we ask questions of firms, we have to accept that the 
answers might not always be precise and that there may be a range of 
judgment-based outcomes which are acceptable. 
In short, it’s a question of striking the right balance between 
simplicity and detail.  Einstein said, “Everything should be made as 
simple as possible, but not simpler.”48
Now, the benefits of this light-touch approach to regulation are 
borne out by the figures.  I wouldn’t be a regulator without throwing in a 
few figures. 
By the end of September this year, companies had raised more 
capital on the main market of the London Stock Exchange, $26.7 
billion,49 than the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ combined, 
$26.4 billion50— and this didn’t even include the $6.7 billion raised on 
the London Stock Exchange’s alternative investment market.51
 48. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 281 (1st ed. 1986).
 49. See London Stock Exchange, Investment News, With-Profit Insurers Show 
Strong Capital Strength (July 4, 2005), available at http://www.londonstockexchange. 
com/en-gb/pricesnews/investnews/article.htm?ArticleID=16087757 (last visited Nov. 6 
2006). 
 50. For the most recent information supporting these figures, see LSE Success 
Prompts New York Fight Back, AFX INTERNATIONAL FOCUS, Sept. 24, 2006, available 
at http://www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-2006-09/artikel-7035593.asp (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2007). 
 51. See Ian Bailey, Beginning Life as a UK-Listed Company, 
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The figures are even more stark when you look at international 
IPOs.  So far this year, the LSE has attracted fifty-nine deals worth 
$15.9 billion, whilst the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ 
together have only attracted seventeen deals worth $5.9 billion.52
Now, I’ll say straight away, I better had say it in front of this 
audience, that I am not gloating about any of this—of course not, 
absolutely not.  And I do know that New York’s performance of late in 
comparison to London has caused a great deal of concern in your 
corridors of power.  I understand that Mayor Bloomberg has recently 
appointed a consultant to look at just this issue53 and that Treasury 
Secretary Paulson has mobilized a team of experts to look at the effects 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation.54
However, I do believe, to use the words of a leading U.K. financial 
journalist in The Daily Telegraph, that “there is a regulatory dividend 
that London enjoys under the auspices of the Financial Services 
Authority: and that that dividend has bolstered London’s status to 
establish itself as the world’s leading center for mobile capital.”55
Now, this whole issue of our different regulatory approaches was 
thrown into stark relief recently, when Ed Balls, Economic Secretary to 
the Treasury—that’s a kind of Deputy Chancellor of the Exchequer—
announced a month ago that “the FSA will be given new powers to veto 
rule changes to exchanges that it considers to be too draconian and 
disproportionate in their impact.”56  The government was at pains to 
emphasize that this unprecedented move was not protectionist and was 
not aimed at deterring foreign buyers from buying on our exchanges.  
http://www.webershandwick.com/newsroom/thoughtleadership.cfm/contentid,13968.ht
ml (last visited Feb. 2, 2007) (note amount listed in pounds). 
 52. David Seifman, IPO Turf Wars – City Hires McKinsey to Study Biz Drain to 
London, NEW YORK POST, Sept. 27, 2006, at 33. 
 53. See LSE Success Prompts New York Fight Back, AFX INTERNATIONAL FOCUS, 
Sept. 24, 2006, available at http://www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-2006-
09/artikel-7035593.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 2007). 
 54. See Paul Tharp, Paulson Posse Targets Sarbanes, N.Y. POST, Oct. 11, 2006, at 
37. 
 55. Damian Reece, London Confirms its Reputation as the Capital City, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH, Sept. 27, 2006, at 2. 
 56. Ed Balls, Economic Secretary to the Treasury, Financial Services: a U.K. 
Perspective, Address at the Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce and the British 
Chamber of Commerce (Sept. 13, 2006), available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/newsroom_and_speeches/speeches/econsecspeeches/speech_est_13090
6.cfm (last visited Jan. 23, 2007). 
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However, it is clear that the possibility of a takeover of the London 
Stock Exchange by NASDAQ, which already owns twenty-five percent 
and is no longer barred from increasing that stake, and anxiety at the 
prospect of rules driven by Sarbanes-Oxley regulating the London Stock 
Exchange played a major part in this.57  The FSA welcomed this move 
by government to create a legal ring fence and ensure that London 
continues to enjoy the competitive advantage it derives from domestic 
regulation. 
Equally, we welcome and are hugely encouraged by the SEC’s 
pledge at the end of last month not to apply U.S. rules to European 
exchanges that are taken over by American exchanges.58  This is a 
testament to the open and constructive dialogue between the SEC and 
the FSA on matters of mutual interest. 
Now, at this stage you might be forgiven for wondering when or 
whether I’ll get around to talking about enforcement.  After all, I am the 
FSA’s Director of Enforcement. 
So where does enforcement fit into this picture?  Well, a clue lies in 
the fact that my team of approximately 288 people represents just eight 
percent of the total staff of the FSA.  Contrast this with the SEC, whose 
Enforcement Division makes up just over half of the SEC’s total 
personnel nationwide.59
The FSA is not an enforcement-led regulator.  Enforcement is one 
of a range of tools available to deal with noncompliant behavior, but it is 
not the most widely used.  It is used selectively and strategically as part 
of our overall risk-based supervisory strategy and in support of the 
FSA’s objectives. 
Consistent with this, the Enforcement Division does not have its 
own freestanding priorities.  Our priorities are the same as those of the 
FSA as a whole, and our work is driven by the needs of the rest of the 
organization.  Two big priority areas for the FSA, and therefore for the 
Enforcement Division, are market abuse on the wholesale side and 
treating customers fairly on the retail side. 
 57. See Exchange Chief Warns of Merger Manipulation, CANBERRA TIMES, Oct. 
14, 2006 and Chris Noon, Greifeld’s NASDAQ Ups LSE Stake Again, FORBES, May 19, 
2006. 
 58. Norma Cohen, U.S. and E.C. Reassure on Local Rules Stock Exchanges, 
FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 28, 2006, at 27. 
 59. See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains 
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/ 
whatwedo.shtml (last visited Feb. 22, 2007) (noting the staff of the SEC is 3,100). 
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A key focus in the FSA’s efforts to ensure the integrity of the 
markets in the United Kingdom is to deter market abuse.  An appropriate 
enforcement action that sends out strong messages is a very important 
part of achieving deterrence, but we generally regard non-enforcement 
options—such as proactive surveillance of likely hot spots, up-to-date 
transaction analysis systems, and industry cooperation to ensure a steady 
flow of information—as more desirable.  We take the view that 
prevention is better than cure. 
An interesting dimension to this priority is the role played by hedge 
funds, a subject I flagged earlier, which is of much topical interest, of 
course.  Indeed, it is not possible to open a newspaper, either in London 
or in New York, without reading about the latest issue concerning hedge 
funds, be it in connection with the regulation of hedge funds or the 
absence of it, the risk of the misuse of insider information by hedge 
funds (witness the SEC’s investigation into the Movie Gallery case, 
which was featured on the front page of yesterday’s New York Times60), 
the well-publicized difficulties of Enron or the risks posed by an 
industry that has become so dominant that it accounts for roughly half 
the trading on the London and New York stock exchanges.61
It is important to emphasize that the FSA does not, and is not 
seeking to, authorize and regulate the funds themselves, which are 
outside our jurisdiction.  Rather, we continue to believe that we can 
mitigate the risks through our existing authority over hedge fund 
managers and broker-dealers who provide prime brokerage services to 
the funds. 
Of particular interest to us in the Enforcement Division is the FSA’s 
belief that some hedge funds may be testing the boundaries of 
acceptable practice with respect to insider trading and market 
manipulation.  In addition, given the payment of significant 
commissions and close relations with counterparties, they may be 
creating incentives for others to commit market abuse. 
Characteristically, our main response has been on the surveillance 
side, and we have recently devised metrics to measure the incidence of 
unusual price movements in order to see if this belief is correct.  
However, we have also used our enforcement powers against hedge 
funds acting improperly on our markets, most notably in the GLG 
 60. Jenny Anderson, As Lenders Hedge Funds Draw Insider Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 16, 2006, at A1. 
 61. Id. 
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case.62
The FSA’s initiative aimed at treating customers fairly is a prime 
example of the FSA’s strategic shift to more principles-based regulation.  
The initiative is of great importance for retail financial markets in the 
United Kingdom and is directed at improving the outcomes for 
consumers in these markets.  Through this work, we hope that the 
industry will move to a position where consumers can be confident that 
they are dealing with firms where the fair treatment of customers is 
central to the corporate culture. 
Although much of this work is done through supervision and 
education, the treating-customers-fairly agenda is also keeping the 
Enforcement Division very busy.  As I hope is evident, in the United 
Kingdom enforcement is a small part of the regulatory relationship.  It is 
used strategically for the most egregious cases and where necessary to 
protect markets and consumers.  We put great emphasis on the messages 
sent out to the markets through careful selection of cases and leverage 
off the publicity that they generate. 
However, the potential impact of enforcement action is very 
significant.  My division generates more publicity, both good and bad, 
for the organization than any other.  Our enforcement outcomes play a 
very significant role in educating the industry and consumers about 
issues of concern and the FSA’s approach to them.  They can also be a 
very powerful way of changing behavior and achieving effective 
deterrence more generally, which of course is what enforcement activity 
is all about. 
So what can the FSA do to enforce the provisions of FSMA, as well 
as the principles and rules we issue under that Act?  Well, we are able to 
prosecute insider dealing and market abuse in the criminal courts, as 
well as breaches of the perimeter when people conduct regulated 
activities without authorization.63  I should just say that when we bring 
those actions in the criminal courts, we are the prosecutor; we don’t 
need to refer cases to any other prosecuting body.64  We can also bring 
cases in the civil courts to freeze assets and restrain unauthorized 
 62. Jabre v. Financial Services Authority, [2006] F.S.M.T. (U.K.). 
 63. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, §§ 401-02 (U.K.). 
 64. Contra David R. Chase & Neal Wilson, When the SEC Comes Knocking, BUS. 
LAW TODAY, May/June 2000, available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/blt00may-
sec.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2006) (discussing how the SEC must refer prosecutions to 
the DOJ). 
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behavior,65 but these kinds of cases are quite rare compared with the 
cases that we bring through our own regulatory proceedings.  Our own 
procedures enable us to impose unlimited fines, to withdraw a person’s 
or firm’s ability to conduct regulated activities, or even to prohibit them 
from the industry altogether.66
There are a variety of reasons for regulatory cases making up such a 
large majority of our cases, but I see the main reasons as being: the 
greater scope they offer for establishing breaches; the lower evidentiary 
standards that apply and the consequent lower—but not low, I hasten to 
add—litigation risks they involve; and the greater prospects of 
settlement that they hold out. 
The FSA actively looks for new ways to make sure its penalties 
bring about the deterrent effect that the FSA wants to achieve.  This 
means considering not only the types and levels of penalties that the 
FSA imposes, but making sure that the penalties affect the right people.  
It also means acting with confidence and resolutely taking enforcement 
action where appropriate to convince wrongdoers that there is a real risk 
that they will be caught and proceeded against.  Sometimes it means 
taking important cases, recognizing that they will be difficult to fight 
and that we may not win. 
The Enforcement Division also supports the FSA’s strategic shift to 
more principles-based regulation.  Where appropriate, the FSA can and 
does take enforcement action on the basis of principles alone, and this 
trend will grow. 
Now, I did promise at the beginning of this speech that I’d 
acknowledge that there are some things that we in the United Kingdom 
and we at the FSA might be considered to do less well and where we 
might learn from the way you do things here in the United States. 
It is clear to me that the authorities in the United States, particularly 
in recent years, have been very successful in prosecuting major 
corporate scandals,67 and in doing so recognizing that those at the heart 
 65. See Financial Services Authority Enforcement in the Civil and Criminal Court, 
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/doing/regulated/law/focus/courts.shtml (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2006). 
 66. See Joint Committee on Financial Services and Markets, Second Report, 1999-
9, at 8-17, available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/jt199899/ 
jtselect/jtfinser/465/46502.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2007). 
 67. Christopher Wray, Prosecuting Corporate Crimes, eJournal USA: Economic 
Perspectives, Feb. 2005, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0205/ijee/ 
wray.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2007). 
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of those scandals are criminals and deserve to be brought to justice. 
Eliot Spitzer’s efforts here in New York, of course, are particularly 
well-known.  But they are only part of the picture.  I know that the SEC 
and the Department of Justice have also obtained criminal convictions in 
a number of insider trading cases, some indeed involving hedge funds.68  
With the SEC’s head of enforcement giving testimony before the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary only a few weeks ago,69 it is clearly a matter 
that is very much in the spotlight. 
In the United Kingdom, we have the Serious Fraud Office, whose 
sole role it is to investigate and prosecute serious and complex fraud, 
and who conclude in the region of about ten such trials a year.70
As far as the FSA is concerned, we have successfully brought a 
number of prosecutions against people who have acted without 
appropriate authorization.  But we have only used our prosecutorial 
powers against someone who has committed an offense in our markets 
once, and that was last year, when we successfully prosecuted directors 
of the AIT Group for criminal market abuse by making false and 
misleading statements to the market.71
While some notable victories have been achieved in the United 
Kingdom—for example, the City Slickers72 prosecution by our 
Department of Trade and Industry, and convictions arising from the 
Guinness trials73—overall, successful prosecutions of so-called white-
collar criminals are sparse. 
Now, it seems to me there are clearly some cultural and 
environmental differences between our two countries, which perhaps, in 
part at least, explain our different appetite for prosecution of major 
corporate and financial scandals. 
First, for the last ten years or so, after the scandals of the early 
1990s—which I was intimately concerned with as a lawyer trying to sort 
 68. See, e.g., U.S. v. Pollet, 05 Cr. 287 (E.D.N.Y. April 26, 2005).
 69. Testimony Concerning Insider Trading before the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, (Oct. 5, 2006) (statement of Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director, SEC Div. of 
Enforcement), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2006/ts120506lct.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2007). 
 70. See FSA Introduction, supra note 27, at 22. 
 71. Press Release, Financial Services Authority, FSA Secures Convictions in First 
Criminal Market Abuse Case (Aug. 18, 2005), available at http://www.fsa. 
gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2005/091.shtml (last visited Jan. 15, 2007). 
 72. R v Hipwell, [2006] E.W.C.A. (Crim.) 736 (Eng.); see also James Daley, The 
‘Mirror’ Shares Scandal: City Slickers Found Guilty, THE INDEPENDENT, Dec. 8, 2005. 
 73. R v Saunders, [1996] 1 Crim. App. Rep. 463 (Eng.). 
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them out, I hasten to add, most notably the BCCI74 and Maxwell75 
pension fund matters—we’ve been enjoying a relatively quiet time on 
this front, perhaps because our economy has generally been so buoyant. 
Second, looking across from my side of the Atlantic, there appears 
to be greater public support in the United States than there is in the 
United Kingdom for seeing alleged corporate fraudsters and financial 
wrongdoings prosecuted in the criminal courts.  And, indeed, there 
seems to be a greater willingness of juries to convict. 
Third—and I hope this bit isn’t too controversial—if my 
understanding of arrangements in the United States is correct, district 
attorneys are elected in most districts and attorneys general are elected 
in most states.  These posts are used by many as a springboard for a 
career in mainstream politics.  Well, although many lawyers in the 
United Kingdom do end up in politics—our Prime Minister, Mr. Blair, 
for example—the vast majority of them come from private practice 
rather than from the Crown Prosecution Service.  The link between 
political office and prosecution is not a well-established one.  A proven 
track record in prosecuting white-collar crime clearly has a much greater 
positive impact on a prosecutor’s current and future career in the United 
States than it does in the United Kingdom. 
Finally, plea bargaining and the giving of state’s evidence by 
accomplices.  In the United Kingdom, we call this giving Queen’s 
evidence.  This is a practice that is explicitly recognized in U.S. criminal 
practice, and as such is a very valuable tool for obtaining convictions of 
all manner of offenders.  By contrast, it is not a practice that is formally 
recognized in our system and is not one of which our legal establishment 
has traditionally approved. 
Over 350 years ago, Chief Justice Hale expressed his distaste for 
pleas of approvement.  That was the term used at the time for granting 
immunity from prosecution to accomplices willing to give evidence to 
the Crown.  He said: “The truth is that more mischief hath come to good 
men by these kinds of approvements, by false accusations of desperate 
villains, than benefit to the public by the discovery and convicting of 
real offenders.”76  How much sympathy would that view find, I wonder, 
in the United States? 
 74. R v Inst. of Chartered Accountants, [1994] B.C.C. 736 (Eng.). 
 75. MGN Pension Trs. Ltd. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust and Savings Ass’n, [1995] 
2 A.I.I. E.R. 355 (Ch.) (Eng.). 
 76. 2 Sir Matthew Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown 161 (1736). 
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But as I said earlier, the FSA has very wide responsibilities and 
limited resources and we take a risk-based approach to applying our 
resources in enforcement cases.  From a risk-based perspective, we often 
feel it is a better use for our scarce enforcement resource to seek a 
quicker and less uncertain regulatory outcome. 
It is not as if the consequences of our own administrative regulatory 
proceedings are not serious.  As I said earlier, we ban people from the 
industry, for life if necessary, and we have unlimited fining powers.  
Nevertheless, we have stated publicly that, despite the well-documented 
difficulties of criminal prosecutions, some of which the SEC’s Head of 
Enforcement outlined in her recent testimony on Capitol Hill, there are 
some cases where this route is the appropriate course, and we expect to 
bring more criminal prosecutions going forward. 
So, to conclude, I propose to you, ladies and gentlemen, that 
nobody does it better than the FSA.  I believe that our light-touch 
approach to regulation, with its growing emphasis on principles, backed 
up by bold and strategic enforcement action, is highly effective.  I would 
point to London’s current success on the global stage as irrefutable 
evidence of this.  But we also know that we are not perfect.  This is a 
very competitive world, and we don’t intend to rest on our laurels. 
Now, thankfully for me, because this isn’t a debate, I am very 
relieved that my proposition will not be tested here tonight by a vote. 
Thank you very much.  Now for the difficult part, I’d be delighted 
to take some questions, especially easy ones. 
QUESTION: As the United Kingdom becomes more integrated 
with the European Union, and when—perhaps I should say if—the 
United Kingdom were to ever accept the Euro, where do you see the 
FSA in terms of its evolution into a Brussels-type regulatory 
environment? 
MS. COLE: When I talk about moving to more principles-based 
regulation, of course we can’t ditch the rulebook.  I mean it is very much 
a philosophy that we hope will move regulation and behavior in the right 
direction.  One of the big reasons why we are clearly going to have 
trouble ditching the rulebook is because most of the new rules that we 
have to address come from Europe.  So you are very right to make the 
point.  It is a very significant issue for us. 
Whenever we have to look at the implementation of a new 
Directive, as we do with some degree of regularity, we look very 
carefully at what we need to bring in, how far we can go to satisfy the 
Directive without going any further.  It really is, as you point out, a very 
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significant issue, in terms of what we want for our philosophy going 
forward. 
In terms of Europe more generally, I would say from time to time 
there is talk of a single European regulator for financial services.  
Clearly, if there were to be such, we would want to be it.  Or would we?  
I don’t know.  Generally, I think we have lobbied behind the scenes to 
ensure that no such circumstance ever comes about. 
I don’t know other than that.  I can’t say where we’ll be in terms of 
integrating further into Europe.  I can’t see any prospect of our losing 
our currency on the horizon, for example.  But it is a very pertinent 
question. 
QUESTION: What’s your take on all of the corporate scandals that 
have been experienced over here?  What is the reaction of people 
overseas to that? 
MS. COLE: One of the points that I was seeking to make is that we 
try very often not to rush to a knee-jerk reaction of more regulation 
when something goes wrong.  There is a powerful head of steam that 
gets up in that direction when you have, obviously, a scandal, or some 
“mis-selling,” as we say, for example, as we have had in the United 
Kingdom.  But we do try to focus on market solutions and such things 
like that. 
I was talking before I came in this evening about, in terms of this 
issue of prosecution of corporate scandals, how we in the United 
Kingdom, I think, seem to be about twenty years behind you here, 
because—if I understood this correctly—the prosecutions of some of the 
financial and corporate scandals really got going in about the mid-1980s.  
So I am very intrigued to see, because, generally, whatever happens over 
here we eventually catch up.  Whether we will go in the same direction I 
don’t know. 
The criminal prosecutions by a securities regulator really require 
huge and significant resources.  We have this risk-based approach, 
where we try to use finite resources to manage our cases in what we 
consider the most appropriate way.  So we are never likely to have the 
resources to bring a lot of major prosecutions simultaneously. 
I think the SEC, and also the fact that the DOJ is a separate 
prosecuting body, just gives you the greater capacity to bring those sorts 
of cases. 
QUESTION: Could you give us some examples of regulatory 
responses, where you forgo an enforcement proceeding, how you 
achieve the regulatory result? 
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MS. COLE: Yes.  Quite a lot gets done through the supervision 
angle.  So cases sometimes don’t get referred to Enforcement; they get 
dealt with by the supervisors of the firm.  The majority of the activity 
that we conduct—we have authorization, we have supervision, and we 
have enforcement—but the majority of the FSA’s resources is in the 
area of supervision. 
So if there is on the retail side, for example, something where 
customers have been badly affected, by mis-selling or something like 
that, or they haven’t been treated fairly, it isn’t essential that the case 
will come into Enforcement.  It may be that the supervisors will agree on 
a remediation program, for example, with the firm.  That could also be 
done in the enforcement context.  But I talked about enforcement just 
being one of the tools.  The supervisors very often do agree on packages 
with firms that mean that it is not necessary to go to Enforcement. 
QUESTIONER: Is that public? 
MS. COLE: Is it public that that happens?  Yes, because the 
remediation package very often can become public.  But you’re right in 
saying that it’s only when you have an enforcement outcome that we are 
required by the statute to publish.77  So if the supervisors deal with an 
issue with a firm, sometimes, very often, it won’t become public.  
Sometimes it will.  If we deal with an issue through the Enforcement 
Division and we have a regulatory outcome, we are required to publish 
that. 
QUESTION: I’m sort of interested in a question that would 
compare and contrast what is expected of your agency with what’s 
expected of the various levels of enforcement and prosecution in the 
United States with this example.  Let’s say somebody in some Midlands 
city operating a firm that is not regulated—or authorized, in your 
words—by your agency sells £40 or £50 million worth of investment 
notes in an enterprise that is held out as being essentially an investment 
vehicle into up-and-coming businesses.  But, after a while, whatever the 
initial intentions, it sort of degenerates into a Ponzi scheme, and the 
proprietors essentially are driving around in big cars and buying big 
houses, but not too much gets invested in companies, and so on and so 
forth.  It may be hundreds of people, or maybe a thousand people, are 
 77. See Delivering Better Regulatory Outcomes: Joint FSA and OFT Action Plan, 
available at http://72.14.209.104/search?q=cache:bmGW5395a_0J:www.oft.gov.uk/ 
NR/rdonlyres/791987A5-B2F6-460E-91F6-DBA554587854/0/oft838.pdf+british+ 
Enforcement+Division+Outcomes&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=2&client=firefox-a 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2007). 
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out £40 million. 
Is it expected that your agency would lead the charge against that 
type of operation, or would it be the Serious Fraud Office, or would it be 
some other Crown office? 
MS. COLE: We would be very likely to shut them down or injunct 
them, for example, and take them out, and publicize the fact that we had 
done so.  What we wouldn’t be likely to be doing would be helping the 
individuals pursue their private law rights, if I can put it that way. 
As part of an enforcement outcome, we very often do agree on a 
program of remediation, as I described it before, to give money back to 
individuals.  But in the case you’re describing, where we’re talking 
about a completely non-authorized entity that’s probably going to run 
away with the money, we wouldn’t be bringing cases against those 
individuals for restitution of the funds.  We could, but we rarely do it 
that way.  We would be focusing more on the bigger regulatory issue.  
But we would shut it down. 
Now, the Serious Fraud Office might bring a criminal prosecution if 
the fraud was big enough, or the Crown Prosecution Service might in the 
case of a smaller fraud.  But in terms of criminal prosecutions, our remit 
is in the area of market abuse and insider dealing or in the area of 
removing unauthorized firms. 
Maybe two more questions. 
QUESTION: What is the relationship of your organization to the 
Proceeds of Crime Act?78
MS. COLE: Well, as you heard, we have a statutory objective 
around the subject of reducing financial crime, so we don’t have a direct 
relation with the Proceeds of Crime Act.  But, in connection with the 
financial crime part of what we do, we do look at money-laundering 
cases, for example, insofar as they fit into that overall objective, and we 
might bring regulatory action in that area. 
QUESTIONER: Where there are financial institutions that are a 
part of it? 
MS. COLE: Yes, indeed. 
I think there was one more question. 
QUESTION: You said that you don’t regulate hedge funds but you 
do regulate their advisors. 
MS. COLE: Yes. 
QUESTIONER: In the States, the debate is whether we should 
 78. Proceeds of Crime Act, 2002 c. 29 (Eng.). 
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regulate hedge funds by regulating the advisors.  Is there a class of 
advisors to hedge funds that is not under supervision in the United 
Kingdom? 
MS. COLE: I don’t think so.  Off the top of my head, I don’t know 
any.  I know you are having quite a significant debate about that.  I’ve 
also read about a legal case where the decision of the SEC to do it in 
some particular way was overturned?79  So I know there is quite a lot 
going on. 
At the moment—and who knows what’s going to happen next—we 
are very much steering away from authorizing or regulating hedge 
funds. 
PROF. FISCH: Please join me in thanking Margaret Cole.  And let 
me invite you all to the reception outside. 
 
 79. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
